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Abstract
We model the impact of different modes of multinational entry on the choices of domestic
ﬁrms. Focusing on the competitive effects of foreign presence in the host country we demonstrate
that greenﬁeld investment will increase competition only if it is not countered by anti-competitive
reactions on the part of the domestic ﬁrms. Considering also cross-border mergers and acqui-
sitions the model, thus, provides two alternative explanations for the increase in concentration
ratios in industries with mostly horizontal foreign direct investment. Moreover, foreign presence
is shown to raise total investment in the local industry at the cost of crowding out domestic R&D.
Keywords: greenﬁeld investment, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, host-country effects, market
structure, cost-reducing R&D investment
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Worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown impressively in the past 30 years. According
to the World Investment Report 2004 (UNCTAD (2004)) FDI inward stock has grown on average
at 13,1% per year between 1986 and 2003. Since the late 1980s FDI has increasingly taken the
form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rather than greenﬁeld investment (UNCTAD
(2000)). At the same time concentration ratios in industries with strong horizontal FDI activity such
as automobiles, pharmaceuticals and banking have risen (UNCTAD (1999)). Taken together this
suggests that multinational enterprises (MNE) are increasing in size, if not also in efﬁciency.1 The
impact of these multinational players is likely to be felt strongest in the markets they enter. Previous
work has mainly examined this in the light of technology spillovers from the foreign to the domestic
ﬁrms. However, entry by a foreign multinational enterprise constitutes ﬁrst of all a major change
in the market structure of the host country industry. This may induce a reaction by the domestic
ﬁrms that can take the form of investment in technology, exit, or a domestic merger. The aim of
this chapter is to emphasise this latter aspect by examining the interaction between different modes
of multinational entry and the induced moves of the domestic ﬁrms regarding changes in market
structure, R&D investment and welfare.
Fromtheperspectiveofanindividualmultinationalﬁrm, thechoicebetweenacross-bordermerger
or acquisition and greenﬁeld entry is ascribed to different ﬁrm characteristics (see UNCTAD (2000,
p. 145) and Kang and Johansson (2000)). Good organisational and managerial skills, high advertising
intensity, and the prospect of a speedy market entry are more conducive to M&A. Whereas a techno-
logical advantage works in favour of greenﬁeld investment. Host country governments, in turn, tend
to have different concerns when it comes to choose between these two alternatives. Often they favour
greenﬁeld investment as it is said to increase competition by adding new production capacity to the
market. M&As, in contrast, are associated with a decrease in competition or at best with no change
in market structure. However, this perception disregards that ﬁrms acquired by foreign investors may
initiate competition with incumbents in the host country, for example with the help of superior tech-
nological skills from parent companies. Furthermore, if inefﬁcient target ﬁrms which otherwise may
be forced to exit are acquired and restructured by foreign investors, M&As may enhance competition
in the host country. By the same token, it is possible that an initial increase in competition through
greenﬁeld entry may trigger domestic ﬁrms to exit or to merge. While documentation of these issues
is scarce, exit is shown to be a relevant strategy for domestic ﬁrms by De Backer and Sleuwaegen
(2003). They ﬁnd that import competition as well as FDI discourage entry and stimulate exit of do-
mestic entrepreneurs in a sample of Belgian manufacturing ﬁrms. Accentuating the importance of
research and development (R&D) in their analysis of Irish manufacturing, Görg and Strobl (2003)
show that the presence of foreign ﬁrms can also have a life-enhancing effect on domestic ﬁrms, but
this is the case only in high-tech sectors.
1A number of empirical studies conﬁrm that MNEs are, in most cases, the largest and most efﬁcient ﬁrms in an industry.
See Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch. 7.3) for an overview.
2Next to its original intentions the empirical literature on technology spillovers renders a closer
look at the impact of foreign entry on changes in market structure and competition in the host country
an interesting exercise. A difﬁculty with many of these papers is that the available data does very
often not allow to divorce spillover effects from pro-competitive effects of multinational presence.
Görg and Strobl (2003) ascribe their above mentioned ﬁnding of a life-enhancing effect on Irish ﬁrms
to technology spillovers from the foreign ﬁrms in the market. However, the majority of the empirical
studies examining horizontal spillovers ﬁnds a negative impact of foreign presence on domestic ﬁrms
or industries (see Görg and Greenaway (2004) for a survey). This suggests that the pro-competitive
effects from foreign entry outweigh potential spillover effects at least in the short run. Sembenelli and
Siotis (2005) conﬁrm this in their study of Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms where they make an attempt
to disentangle the pro-competitive and the spillover effects. They ﬁnd that especially in non-R&D
intensive sectors the entry of MNEs dampens the proﬁt margins of local ﬁrms in the short run, to give
way to efﬁciency-enhancing effects in the longer run. Overall, this suggests that the pro-competitive
effects from foreign entry on the host country are strong and that domestic ﬁrms are more likely to be
able to put up with them in high-tech sectors.
Thetheoreticalliteraturehaslongtreatedforeigndirectinvestmentasahomogenousphenomenon,
where cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenﬁeld investment are observationally equivalent.
The focus of recent papers breaking with this tradition is mostly on the multinational ﬁrms’ motives
for choosing one mode of entry over another accounting for host country characteristics, e.g. Horn
and Persson (2001), Bjorvatn (2004), Eicher and Kang (2004), Nocke and Yeaple (2004). In the model
presented here we look at i) how the MNE’s mode of entry choice is affected when the ﬁrms in the
host country are allowed to react; ii) how this interaction affects market structure and iii) its impact on
the level of R&D investments and welfare in the host country. To this end, we build a four-stage game
where the MNE chooses between entry via acquisition of a domestic ﬁrm and greenﬁeld investment
in the ﬁrst stage of the game. The domestic ﬁrms can react to this choice in the second stage. In the
last two stages of the game all active ﬁrms ﬁrst invest in process R&D before engaging in Cournot
competition in the product market. Two of the issues in this chapter have been addressed before
in settings with one incumbent in the host country. Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990) study the
impact of foreign competition on the innovative efforts of a domestic ﬁrm. Mukherjee (2004) looks at
the welfare implications of greenﬁeld versus acquisition entry in a model of foreign entry and R&D
competition.
The assumption of an asymmetric duopoly as the initial market structure in the host country allows
us to demonstrate that the impact of foreign entry on the host country is not independent of possible
reactions by the local incumbents. In particular, we show that a concentrated market structure may
result even in the case of greenﬁeld entry when the domestic ﬁrms merge or exit the market as a con-
sequence. In this way, the chapter provides an explanation for the increase in concentration ratios in
industries where horizontal FDI is prevalent that is complementary to the surge in cross-border M&A
as a share of FDI. Moreover, we show that a technological advantage of the multinational ﬁrm only
3favours greenﬁeld investment over an acquisition when either the domestic ﬁrms are sufﬁciently com-
petitive or when they are induced to eliminate competition among themselves by merging. Looking
at the incentives to engage in cost-reducing R&D investment in such a setting, we obtain a result that
is very much in line with the empirical evidence: The presence of a more efﬁcient foreign ﬁrm in
the domestic market will increase total R&D investment in the industry. However, this comes at the
cost of crowding out domestic R&D when compared to a situation with domestic ﬁrms only. This
is in contrast to Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990). In their model the less differentiated products,
the less likely a negative impact of multinational presence on local innovative efforts. Finally, while
consumer surplus increases, full proﬁt repatriation on the part of the foreign ﬁrm reduces producer
surplus by so much that domestic welfare will typically be lower after foreign entry. As the focus
in this chapter is on competition, this should be regarded as a lower bound to domestic welfare after
foreign entry.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the components of the
model. In Section 3 the model itself is addressed. First, the properties of the model are presented in the
benchmark equilibrium without foreign entry (3.1); then the game with foreign entry is analysed (3.2).
Section 4 illustrates the equilibrium market structure. Section 5 compares the associated R&D (5.1)
and welfare levels (5.2) to the benchmark situation without foreign presence. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Setup
As the focus here is on the impact of the mode of foreign entry on changes in domestic market
structure, all action will take place in one country. We look at one particular industry in this country.
There are two domestic ﬁrms in this industry, H1 and H2. They differ in their level of marginal cost,
H1 is more efﬁcient than H2: cH1 · cH2. The potential multinational entrant M is assumed to be
more efﬁcient than the domestic ﬁrms, its marginal cost is given by cM, where cM · cH1 · cH2.
All ﬁrms in the market can make investments to reduce marginal cost by an amount xi. Accord-
ingly the kind of investment considered is process R&D.2 Investment is associated with a cost of °x2
i
for all ﬁrms, where ° measures the degree of convexity of the cost function. Convexity of investment
cost is ensured by ° > 3
4:3
Firmsareproducingahomogenousgood. Hence, demandisthesameforallﬁrmswiththeindirect
demand function given by p = a ¡ Q, where a represents the size of the market and Q =
Pn
i=1 qi
is the sum over all ﬁrms’ sales. For ﬁrms to produce positive levels of output, we need a > cH2 ¸
cH1 ¸ cM > 0. The multinational’s and the domestic ﬁrms’ proﬁts are then given by, respectively
¦i (qi;xi) = (p ¡ (ci ¡ xi))qi ¡ °x2
i; where i = M; H1; H2: (1)
2This way of modelling R&D goes back to Brander and Spencer (1983). Investments that increase demand can be
modelled in a similar way (see e.g. Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990)).
3Note that this condition is stronger than the second order condition on investment. It is sufﬁcient for the denominator
of proﬁts to be positive in a situation with three (or less) active ﬁrms in the market.
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The structure of the game is outlined in Figure 1. In the ﬁrst stage the multinational ﬁrm decides
whether and if so how to enter the domestic market. It can either acquire one of the domestic ﬁrms or
set up its own plant (i.e. greenﬁeld investment). 4 If the MNE decides to enter via an acquisition, it will
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the domestic ﬁrms. Mergers and acquisitions are modelled
here as was ﬁrst done by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), that is the target ﬁrm is compensated
for being taken over and then vanishes.5 Greenﬁeld investment by the MNE is associated with a ﬁxed
cost of setting up production facilities f.
When the domestic ﬁrms can react to the MNE’s decision in the second stage, they observe the
multinational’s decision of the ﬁrst stage. That is they either observe a greenﬁeld entry on the part of
the MNE or either of them receives a takeover offer. In the case of greenﬁeld investment, entry by the
MNE may induce exit or a merger among the domestic ﬁrms. In the case of entry via acquisition, the
domestic ﬁrms can accept or reject the take-it-or-leave-it offer. Similarly an acquisition also has the
potential to force the non-acquired ﬁrm out of the market.
In the third stage of the game, all active old and new entities of ﬁrms decide how much to invest in
a cost reducing technology before engaging in Cournot competition in the last stage of the game. The
game consists of these last two stages for the domestic ﬁrms only if the multinational ﬁrm decides not
4This choice of alternatives for a ﬁrm to serve a market abroad is not exhaustive, especially exports are disregarded for
simplicity. See e.g. Bjorvatn (2004) on the latter and Buckley and Casson (1998) for a fairly comprehensive treatment of
possible supply modes from abroad.
5Note, however, that the assumption of different marginal cost does not imply the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)
result that mergers will only be proﬁtable if they involve at least 80% of the ﬁrms in an industry.
5to enter the market. As will be detailed further in the next section, the notation in square brackets at
the bottom of Figure 1 describes the resulting market structure outcomes. For example [;, H1, H2]
states that only the two domestic ﬁrms are present in the market.
To understand the structure of the game and in particular the possibility of mergers and acqui-
sitions, note that we assume a competition authority in the background that follows a simple rule:
namely to prohibit mergers or acquisitions that lead to monopoly. A ﬁnal assumption is that whenever
two ﬁrms form a new entity, they will be able to use the technology of the more efﬁcient ﬁrm without
additional cost, i.e. technology transfer is costless.6
3 The Model
3.1 Benchmark without Foreign Entry
The situation without foreign entry, i.e. the right hand arm of Figure 1, is considered to be the initial
market structure and also the benchmark. We are, hence, looking at the solution to a two-stage game,
where the two domestic ﬁrms decide about investments in technology in the ﬁrst stage and engage in
Cournot competition in the second stage. The game is solved by backward induction. Equilibrium
proﬁts are given in the top part of Table 1 (see [;,H1,H2]). For H2 to produce positive quantities in
equilibrium, the following condition needs to be satisﬁed:
cD exit
H2 ·




levels of investment in equilibrium.
Sales are increasing in market size a, decreasing in own initial marginal cost ci, increasing in the
marginal cost of the competitor(s) c¡i, decreasing in the technology parameter °, and decreasing in
the number of active ﬁrms in the market. With the exception of c¡i, the same is true for investment.
Whether a ﬁrm’s investment level is increasing or decreasing in the marginal cost of its competitor(s)
depends on its efﬁciency relative to the average efﬁciency (marginal cost) in the market. As shown
in Boone (2000), ﬁrms that are far ahead or far behind their competitors have the least incentives to
reduce marginal cost.
6Authors who consider technology transfer explicitly include Wang and Blomström (1992), Glass and Saggi (2002) and
Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004).
6Table 1: Net proﬁts
Domestic Firms only (Benchmark)
[;; H1; H2]
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73.2 The Model with Foreign Entry
Now the game where the MNE actually enters the host country market can be addressed. Again,
solving by backward induction the equilibrium proﬁts under the different entry modes of the MNE
can be obtained as given in Table 1. The different market structure outcomes are explained in detail
below.
When the foreign ﬁrm acquires home ﬁrm H1 for the takeover price v1, there are two possible
market structure outcomes. One in which the new joint entity of M&H1 shares the market with
the less efﬁcient home ﬁrm [M&H1,H2], and another one where the acquisition of H1 by the MNE
induces H2 to exit [M&H1,;]. We assume that the competition authorities cannot fully observe the
ﬁrms’costparametersand, thus, willonlyblockmergersoracquisitionsthatleadtomonopolydirectly
(i.e. when there are initially only two ﬁrms in the market), but not when a monopoly arises due to the
exit of the less efﬁcient ﬁrm after a takeover. When, instead, the MNE decides to acquire H2 for the
takeover price v2, the market consists of the new entity M&H2 and the more efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm
[M&H2,H1]. As will be shown later, exit of H1 due to the takeover is a theoretical possibility but
will not occur in equilibrium.
If the MNE engages in greenﬁeld investment and establishes its own plant in the host country
market there are three possible market structure outcomes. One possibility is that all three ﬁrms are
active [M,H1,H2]. The other two possibilities are that the two domestic ﬁrms merge [M,H1&H2] or
that the less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm is driven out of the market [M,H1,;].
We will now analyse each of the multinational’s alternatives separately, in order to then determine
the equilibrium outcomes depending on parameter values. Consider ﬁrst the case of multinational
entry by acquisition.
3.2.1 Acquisition decision
If the MNE decides to enter the domestic market by acquisition, its choice among the domestic ﬁrms
will depend on the cost of the target ﬁrm and on the proﬁts under the resulting market structure.
Acquisition of the more efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H1
When the more efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H1 gets a take-it-or-leave-it-offer from the MNE, it will accept
the offer for any quote v1 that gives it at least the proﬁts it would earn if the MNE had decided to take
over the other domestic ﬁrm H2, that is
v1 ¸ ° (9° ¡ 4)
µ
3° (a + cM ¡ 2cH1) ¡ 2(a ¡ cH1)
(9° ¡ 2)(3° ¡ 2)
¶2
: (3)
If H1 accepts, this leaves the MNE with net proﬁts of ¦
M&H1;H2
M ¡ v1. It is straightforward to show
that under the assumed ranking of marginal cost cH2 ¸ cH1 ¸ cM an acquisition of H1 is always
proﬁtable (see also Appendix A.1.1).
8When the MNE decides to buy H1, the condition for the less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H2 to leave




3° (a + cM) ¡ 2a
2(3° ¡ 1)
(4)
Thus, above this threshold the newly merged entity of M&H1 will earn monopoly proﬁts after com-
pensating H1 for the takeover. These are always positive as a > cM by assumption.
In this range of parameter values the MNE could instead obtain H2 for free (v2 = 0). It turns out,
however, that the monopoly outcome is more attractive for the MNE even though it has to compensate
H1 for the takeover. In other words, the MNE prefers to pay a price to have the market to itself, than
to share it with a competitor for free. (Proof: see Appendix A.1.2.)
Acquisition of the less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H2
If, instead, the MNE makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm, H2 will
accept for any price that is at least as large as the proﬁts it would earn if the MNE took over H1 :
v2 = max
"
0; ° (9° ¡ 4)
µ
3° (a + cM ¡ 2cH2) ¡ 2(a ¡ cH2)
(9° ¡ 2)(3° ¡ 2)
¶2#
: (5)
As long as v2 is non-zero, the MNE’s proﬁts after the takeover ¦
M&H2;H1
M ¡ v2 are positive for
cH2 ¸ cH1 ¸ cM and cH2 ·
3°(2a¡cM+cH1)¡2(2a¡cM)
2(3°¡1) (see also Appendix A.1.3).
Note that an acquisition of H2 by the MNE will not induce the more efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H1
to leave the market. As is demonstrated in Appendix A.1.4 the hypothetical threshold for H1 to exit
in this case lies in the region where the MNE will prefer to acquire H1: Therefore, H1 will always be
in the market when the MNE acquires H2:
Acquisition of H1 versus acquisition of H2
Comparing the payoffs for the MNE under both scenarios gives the threshold above which the MNE
will prefer to acquire H1 rather than H2:
cA_H2vsH1
H2 >
9°2 (2a + 8cM ¡ 5cH1) ¡ 24° (a + cM ¡ cH1) + 4a(2a ¡ cH1)
45°2 ¡ 24° + 4
(6)
This result states that for small values of cH2 relative to cH1 the MNE will acquire the less efﬁcient
domestic ﬁrm H2. When H2 is rather inefﬁcient compared to H1 the MNE will acquire the more
efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H1: The intuition for this result can be obtained by looking at the proﬁts after
the takeover and acquisition prices. Holding everything else constant in the case of the acquisition of
H1, the proﬁts for the MNE after the takeover depend positively on cH2 while the price of H1 (v1) is
independent of cH2. In the case of the acquisition of H2, in contrast, the proﬁts after the takeover for
9the MNE do not depend on cH2, the takeover price v2 is, however, decreasing in cH2:
¦
M&H1;H2




M (¢) ¡ v2 (¢;cH2)
¡
The MNE’s net proﬁts from a takeover of either of the domestic ﬁrms are increasing in cH2 over
the relevant range of parameter values. As the proﬁts from an acquisition of H1 (¦
M&H1;H2
M ) and the
takeover price for H2 (v2 = ¦
M&H1;H2
H2 ) are the proﬁts of two ﬁrms in the same market, it is sufﬁcient
to look at the direct effect of a change in cH2: Taking derivatives it is not difﬁcult to show that this
direct effect is stronger on the MNE’s proﬁts after a takeover of H1 than on v2: Ceteris paribus the
larger cH2 - that is the less efﬁcient H2 relative to H1 - the more likely that the MNE buys H1. Put
simply, in order to eliminate as much competition as possible the MNE would always like to acquire
H1; however, there are instances when it can only afford H2.7
As the upper bound on the proﬁtability of a takeover of H2 is larger than the threshold obtained in
equation (6), a takeover of H2 will always be proﬁtable for the MNE up to the threshold above which
it prefers to acquire H1: Note from above that we need not worry about the proﬁtability of a takeover
of H1 as this is proﬁtable over the whole range of parameter values.
3.2.2 Greenﬁeld decision
With greenﬁeld entry by the MNE the number of ﬁrms in the market increases and so the condition
for the less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm to stay in the market is more stringent than in the acquisition case
(cf. equation (4)). H2 will exit the market above
cG_exit
H2 >
4° (a + cM + cH1) ¡ 3a
3(4° ¡ 1)
: (7)
Under greenﬁeld entry, a merger among the domestic ﬁrms may become possible. While the
competition authority would have blocked a merger to monopoly in a situation with the two domestic
ﬁrmsonly, entrybytheMNEmaynowinducetheauthoritiestolookatsuchamergermorefavourably.
A merger among the domestic ﬁrms H1 and H2 will be proﬁtable if their joint proﬁts after the







H2 . The implied threshold for a domestic merger to be proﬁtable c
D_merger
H2 is
given in Appendix A.1.5 as it is very long and does not provide any intuition.
7Note that the threshold implied by equation (6) is not necessarily larger than cH1: Thus when cM is large relative to
cH1; the MNE may be able to afford H1 over the whole range of parameter values.
103.2.3 Greenﬁeld versus Acquisition
Forthecomparisonbetweengreenﬁeldinvestmentandaforeignacquisition, thedimensionconsidered
so far, namely the marginal cost of the ‘pivotal’ ﬁrm H2 is not sufﬁcient. While acquisitions by the
MNE and the reactions of the domestic ﬁrms depend on marginal cost only, for greenﬁeld investment
the ﬁxed cost of setting up a plant f also plays a role. The MNE’s proﬁts net of takeover prices or
ﬁxed cost as given in Table 1 need to be compared to obtain a full characterisation of market structure
outcomes. The thresholds for cH2 computed above determine which of the respective greenﬁeld and
acquisition alternatives have to be compared. The next section presents graphical illustrations of the
equilibrium structures under different parameter combinations.
4 Equilibrium
In order to separate the market structure outcome of the game from the additional effect of cost reduc-
ing R&D, we ﬁrst assume that R&D investment is inﬁnitely costly, that is ° = 1: This amounts to
analysing the game in Figure 1 without R&D investment in the third stage.8 Fixing a = 4; cM = 1;
cH1 = 1:2 (and ° = 1) the equilibrium outcomes can be represented in f; cH2-space as given in
Figure 2. The choice of parameter values allows for a rich set of market structure outcomes, as market
size is relatively large compared to the ﬁrms’ marginal costs.
The domestic ﬁrm H2 is by assumption less efﬁcient than H1 (cH2 ¸ cH1), therefore, attention
can be constrained to values of cH2 larger than cH1 = 1:2. The upper bound for the ﬁeld of action
is given by the condition for H2 to be in the market when the domestic ﬁrms are in the market
alone (equation (2)), that is here equal to cD_exit
H2 = 2:6. The vertical loci in the Figure represent the
thresholds for cH2 computed above. The non-vertical lines are obtained by comparing proﬁts of the
relevant greenﬁeld and acquisition alternatives as given in Table 1 and solving for the ﬁxed cost of
greenﬁeld investment f.
Assuming the ﬁxed cost of greenﬁeld investment f to be equal to zero, we move along the hor-
izontal cH2 ¡ axis from left to right. Close to the origin, that is, when H2 is almost as efﬁcient as
H1; we observe an area where the MNE engages in greenﬁeld investment and the two domestic ﬁrms
stay in the market independently. For values of cH2 above c
D_merger
H2 ; the less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm
H2 would only capture a small share of the market. By merging the two domestic ﬁrms are able to
increase their proﬁt as one ﬁrm with marginal cost cH1 above the sum of their individual proﬁts. For
values of cH2 to the right of cG_exit
H2 greenﬁeld investment by the MNE will induce H2 to exit the
market.
8Note that this reduces the equilibrium proﬁts given in Table 1 to those of a Cournot game with two or three asymmetric
ﬁrms.

































2 [M, H1, Ø]
2 H c
parameters: a = 4; cM = 1; cH1 = 1:2; ° = 1
For values of cH2 up to where the diagonal line meets the horizontal axis, the MNE will engage
in greenﬁeld investment; for values of cH2 above that, it will prefer to acquire H1: In this range, H2
is such an inefﬁcient competitor that the MNE can afford to buy out the more efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm
H1 and still earn higher proﬁts than if it were sharing the market with H1, as would be the case under
greenﬁeld investment. In a situation where H2 is very inefﬁcient even the acquisition of H1 will
induce it to exit the market and create a monopoly for the MNE. This is the case for values of cH2
larger than cA_exit
H2 :
Next consider a move along the vertical axis, that is a situation when both domestic ﬁrms have
identical marginal cost (cH2 = cH1). For low values of ﬁxed setup cost f we observe greenﬁeld
investment with both domestic ﬁrms in the market while, for larger values of f, acquiring H2 is
more proﬁtable. The diagonal locus compares the MNE’s proﬁts under greenﬁeld investment with
both domestic ﬁrms in the market to those under an acquisition of H2: Below this threshold the
MNE shares the proﬁts with two other ﬁrms in the market and has to cover the ﬁxed setup cost,
whereas above it, it has to pay the takeover price to acquire H2; but then only shares the market with
H1: Greenﬁeld investment is proﬁtable up to higher values of ﬁxed setup cost when it induces the
domestic ﬁrms to merge (to the right of c
D_merger
H2 ). In fact, when comparing the MNE’s proﬁts under
an acquisition of H2 to those under greenﬁeld investment with only one efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm in the
market along the curved locus f is exactly equal to the takeover price for H2:
We now turn to investigate the situation with R&D investment. Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium
market structure for the same parameters as in Figure 2 but now ° = 3 rather than inﬁnity. First note

































parameters: a = 4; cM = 1; cH1 = 1:2; ° = 3
that the ﬁeld of action contracts, that is cD_exit
H2 is lower than above. The same observation is also true
for all other thresholds; the R&D stage introduces ﬁercer competition to the game. Given the way
R&D investment is modelled, the multinational, as the most efﬁcient ﬁrm, also beneﬁts the most from
investing to reduce its marginal cost. This distorts the market structure in favour of the MNE. For
example H2 can be more efﬁcient than above and the MNE will still be able to afford H1: In fact,
greenﬁeld investment in this case is no longer proﬁtable up to the level of cH2, where the less efﬁcient
domestic ﬁrm would choose to exit the market.
Summarising the insights of these ﬁgures one obtains the following: First, the threshold for the
less efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm to exit is lower under either form of foreign presence than in its absence.
Thisreﬂectsaﬁnding byDe BackerandSleuwaegen(2003)whoshowthatthe inﬂowofFDI increases
domestic exit rates in a sample of Belgian manufacturing ﬁrms.
Second, while it is often held that greenﬁeld investment is more likely when the MNE has a
technological advantage, this is not the case per se in this setting. A technological advantage alone
is not sufﬁcient. Greenﬁeld investment here is an attractive choice for the MNE in two cases. One
is when the domestic ﬁrms are both rather competitive relative to the MNE. The reason for this is
that when all three ﬁrms have similar levels of marginal cost, their proﬁts are close to those in an
equilibrium with symmetric ﬁrms, and hence an acquisition of either of the domestic ﬁrms becomes
13very expensive for the MNE.9 In the other case, that is when the domestic ﬁrms react by merging,
greenﬁeld entry is attractive because the reduction in competition is without cost for the MNE; it only
has to incur the cost of setting up a plant.
The third result concerns the MNE’s choice of takeover target. In principle, the MNE would al-
ways like to acquire the more efﬁcient domestic ﬁrm H1 in order to eliminate the stronger competitor.
However, as long as the MNE’s and the domestic ﬁrms’ marginal costs are not too different, it will
only be able to afford the weaker domestic ﬁrm H2.10 Empirically, at least the ﬁrst observation is in
line with Harris and Robinson (2002), who using a sample of UK manufacturing plants, demonstrate
that foreign acquirers have higher productivity levels (as measured by total factor productivity) and
that they buy the most productive domestic plants.
Finally, with R&D in the model, the pressure on the domestic ﬁrms is stronger. It permits the
MNE, as the most efﬁcient ﬁrm, to achieve a position in the market where it faces relatively little
competition over a wider range of parameter values than in the situation without R&D.
5 R&D Investment and Welfare
Having analysed the impact of R&D on the equilibrium market structure, we now turn to comparing
investment levels and welfare in a situation with the MNE in the market to the benchmark situation
with domestic ﬁrms only.
5.1 R&D Investment
Table 2 provides the R&D levels associated with the different market structures for each ﬁrm indi-
vidually and at the industry level. The right column of Table 2 compares the investment under the
benchmark situation with domestic ﬁrms only to that under the different market structures. One can
see that the presence of a more efﬁcient foreign ﬁrm in the market results in a higher total level of
investment targeted at the domestic market for all market structures other than the monopoly case.
Not surprisingly, a monopolist has little incentive to invest.
Note, however, that entry of the more efﬁcient multinational ﬁrm in most cases leads to the extinc-
tion of at least one of the domestic ﬁrms. As ﬁrms’ investment levels are decreasing in own marginal
9Applying a differentiated products interpretation to a Hotelling model, Eicher and Kang (2004) obtain a different result.
They show that high degrees of competition (i.e. little product differentiation) reduce the likelihood that the MNE coexists
with the local ﬁrm, as entry by the more efﬁcient MNE drives the domestic ﬁrm out of the market.
10These results have to be compared to recent models of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in a general equilibrium
context. In Neary (2004) trade liberalisation may lead to cross-border merger waves with low-cost home (foreign) ﬁrms
buying up high-cost foreign (home) ﬁrms.
In Nocke and Yeaple (2004) cross-border M&A involve either the most or the least efﬁcient active ﬁrms depending on
whether ﬁrms differ in their mobile or non-mobile capabilities. In an industry where ﬁrms differ in mobile factors (i.e.
technology), the most efﬁcient ﬁrms engage in cross-border M&A, less efﬁcient ﬁrms engage in greenﬁeld FDI, while the
least efﬁcient active ﬁrms export. In an industry where ﬁrms differ in immobile capabilities the ranking of choices for the
most efﬁcient to least efﬁcient ﬁrms is greenﬁeld FDI, exports, cross-border M&A.
14Table 2: Investment levels
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i ; where i = H1;H2;total
15cost and increasing in their competitors’ marginal cost, a more efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market reduces
their R&D spending. This can also be seen from Table 2, where we see that R&D investment of the
domestic ﬁrms is higher in the benchmark case than under any of the market structures where the
MNE is in the market. Hence, investment by the MNE crowds out R&D investment by the domestic
ﬁrm(s).
These results are in line with empirical ﬁndings by various authors: Lipsey (2002) in a survey
of home country effects of FDI concludes that overall productivity is improved by the presence of
foreign-owned operations. Concerning the innovative efforts of domestic ﬁrms, Veugelers and Vanden
Houte (1990) ﬁnd them to be reduced by foreign presence in a sample of Belgian manufacturing
ﬁrms, - especially when products are not so differentiated as is the case here. For small Venezuelan
enterprises, Aitken and Harrison (1999) show that foreign equity participation is positively correlated
with plant productivity, whereas foreign investment negatively affects the productivity of domestically
owned ﬁrms. Finally, Drifﬁeld (2001), in a sample of UK manufacturing ﬁrms, estimates inward
investment to stimulate productivity growth in the domestic sector by around 0.75% per annum. He
argues that this is a result of the productivity advantage exhibited by foreign ﬁrms and that it cannot be
attributed to investment or output spillovers. Moreover, he ﬁnds that foreign R&D appears to crowd
out domestic R&D with a negligible effect on domestic productivity.
5.2 Welfare
The welfare levels associated with the different market structure outcomes are given in Table 3. Com-
paring the situation with two domestic ﬁrms only to any situation with foreign presence, welfare in the
host country is higher without the MNE in the market (see Appendix A.3). While there are efﬁciency
gains due to foreign entry that result in higher consumer surplus, the MNE is able to fully convert its
superior efﬁciency into proﬁts and extract them to the detriment of the host country under any possible
market structure outcome.
This result should not be used to demonise any form of foreign direct investment, rather it can be
considered as a lower bound to host country welfare. Very often, host countries are able to beneﬁt
substantially from the presence of multinationals. Most easily this will be the case if the MNE does
not fully repatriate its proﬁts, but reinvests some of the earnings in the host country. Host countries
may further beneﬁt from MNEs under their jurisdiction through taxation, training of local workers,
technology spillovers, and creation of employment.
From Table 3 it is also straightforward to see that the host country would not necessarily make it-
selfbetteroffbybanningforeignentrybyacquisition: welfareunderanacquisitionofH2[M&H2,H1]
is higher than welfare under greenﬁeld entry with the domestic ﬁrms merging [M,H1&H2].11


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter analyses the impact of entry mode and presence of a foreign ﬁrm on the ﬁrms in a
host country. While the prevailing literature is concentrated on technology or productivity spillovers,
we focus on the effects stemming from foreign competition. In particular, we examine changes in
market structure when the domestic ﬁrms do not stay idle after foreign entry. We also investigate how
the interaction between a multinational entrant and the domestic ﬁrms affects R&D investments and
welfare.
While much of the increase in concentration ratios in industries where horizontal FDI is prevalent
can certainly be ascribed to the surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions over the last decade or
more, this chapter offers a complementary explanation. We argue that this can also be due to domestic
ﬁrms merging or exiting the market as a reaction to foreign entry. Moreover, with the chosen setup
it is possible to demonstrate that foreign entry may in fact make it desirable and feasible for domes-
tic incumbents to merge. In turn, anticipating this kind of anti-competitive reaction a multinational
considering to enter the market may prefer to set up its own plant (greenﬁeld investment) to an ac-
quisition of a local ﬁrm. When this sort of strategic interaction is combined with cost-reducing R&D
investments by all active ﬁrms, a technological advantage of the MNE translates into higher R&D
investment at the industry level. However, this comes at the cost of crowding out R&D investment by
the domestic ﬁrm(s).
Regarding welfare, the model allows us to derive a lower bound to host country welfare after
foreign entry. Entry of a more efﬁcient foreign ﬁrm enhances consumer surplus. However, even if
bothdomesticﬁrmsarepresentinthemarketaftermultinationalentry, theirproﬁtsaregreatlyreduced.
This is due to the focus on competition which does not account for the possibilities of host countries
to extract rents from multinational ﬁrms. A possible extension of the model is to compare the welfare
outcomes of different policies towards MNEs and domestic ﬁrms in detail.
These results provide an intuitive explanation for a recurrent ﬁnding in the empirical literature on
spillover effects, namely that foreign presence has a negative impact on the productivity of domestic
ﬁrms. As suggested by Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) these pro-competitive effects are likely to be
short-run phenomena, while technology spillovers and efﬁciency gains through multinationals take
longer to materialise. Along somewhat different lines, Markusen and Venables (1999) emphasise
the potential of backward and forward linkages created by multinationals to offset the possibility of
foreign ﬁrms substituting for domestic production.
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21A Appendix
A.1 Takeover Proﬁtability and Related Thresholds
A.1.1 Proﬁtability of a takeover of H1:
Solving ¦
M&H1;H2





3° : Both of these potential thresholds are dominated by the assumed
structure of marginal cost cH2 ¸ cH1 ¸ cM; as
cH2 ·
¡3°(2a¡cM¡2cH1)+2(2a¡cM¡cH1)
3° ¡ cH1 = ¡
9°¡2




3° ¡ cH1 = ¡
3°¡2
3° (2a ¡ cM ¡ cH1) < 0
A.1.2 Acquiring H1 when it is optimal for H2 not to supply the market versus incorporating
H2 for free
To compare the proﬁts of the MNE when it becomes a monopolist after the acquisition of H1 as H2
exits to incorporating H2 for free, we can write
¦
M&H1;;



































The coefﬁcients on a and cH2 sum to the negative of the coefﬁcient on cH1; hence this expression is
decreasing in cH1: When cH1 approaches its upper bound a12, we have:
¦
M&H1;;








891°3 ¡ 693°2 + 132° ¡ 4
(9° ¡ 2)
2 (3° ¡ 2)
2 (4° ¡ 1)
°2 (a ¡ cM)
2 > 0:
Therefore, it is never proﬁtable for the MNE to incorporate H2 for free, when it can become a mo-
nopolist by acquiring H1:
12Note that 8 does not depend on cH2:
22A.1.3 Proﬁtability of a costly takeover of H2
Solving ¦
M&H2;H1






3° (3cM ¡ 2cH1) ¡ 2cH1
2(3° ¡ 1)
· cH2 ·
3° (2a ¡ cM + cH1) ¡ 2(2a ¡ c1)
2(3° ¡ 1)
:
The lower bound is less stringent than the assumed structure of marginal cost cH2 ¸ cH1 ¸ cM:
3° (3cM ¡ 2cH1) ¡ 2cH1
2(3° ¡ 1)
¡ cH1 = ¡
9° ¡ 2
2(3° ¡ 1)
(cH1 ¡ cM) < 0:




Note that this upper bound is larger than the threshold for a takeover of H1 to be more proﬁtable























The coefﬁcients on a and cH2 add up to the coefﬁcient to cM. Hence, given that we have assumed
a > cH2 ¸ cM this term is always larger than zero.
A.1.4 A takeover of H2 will never induce H1 to leave the market




solving equation (6) for cH1 instead of cH2 yields
cA_H1vsH2
H1 =
9°2 (2a + 8cM ¡ 5cH2) ¡ 24° (a + cM + cH2) ¡ 4(2a ¡ cH2)








Under given assumptions this term is always larger than zero, as the coefﬁcients on a and cH2 add up
to the coefﬁcient on cM. H1 will, therefore, always be in the market when the MNE acquires H2.











° (16° ¡ 9)z;
where
z = 20736°6 (a + cM ¡ 2cH1)
2 ¡ 144°5 (391a + 415cM ¡ 806cH1)(a + cM ¡ 2cH1)
+24°4 ¡
a(2195a + 5171cM ¡ 9561cH1) + 2442c2




17a(839a + 3840cM ¡ 5518cH1) + 26016c2




a(6511a ¡ 19330cM + 6308cH1) ¡ 5921c2





11a(34a ¡ 29cM ¡ 39cH1) ¡ 51c2
M + 421cMcH1 + 4c2
H1
¢
¡36(a ¡ cH1)(19a ¡ 12cM ¡ 7cH1)
(9)


















= 4° (9° ¡ 4)(3° ¡ 1)
3°(a+cM¡2cH2)¡2(a¡cH2)
(9°¡2)2(3°¡2)2




















27°2 ¡ 24° + 4
(a ¡ cH2) > 0
A.3 Welfare
Having a close look at Table 3 allows us to rank unambiguously two market structures according to
the associated welfare levels for all parameters right away:
WM&H2;H1 > WM;H1&H2
WM&H2;H1 ¸ WM&H1;H2
Welfare when the MNE buys H2 is larger than when it engages in greenﬁeld investment with one
domestic ﬁrm in the market and it is also larger than welfare under an acquisition of H1 when H2
remains in the market.
We use the dominated welfare level of greenﬁeld investment with one domestic ﬁrm and compare
it to the monopoly outcome. It is sufﬁcient to base the comparison on consumer surplus as producer
24surplus in the case of WM;H1&H2 cancels with the acquisition price under WM&H1;;:
CSM;H1&H2 ¡ CSM&H1;;
= 9°2 (2a¡cM¡cH1)2





This expression is equal to or larger than zero for cH1 ·
2a(3°¡1)+cM(6°¡1)
4°¡1 : By deﬁnition the largest
value cH1 can take is cH2: If both domestic ﬁrms have identical marginal cost, the exit threshold in a
situation with domestic ﬁrms only applies to both ﬁrms equally and becomes cD_exit
H2 = cD_exit
H1 = a:






4°¡1 ¡ a =
a(2°¡1)+cM(6°¡1)
4°¡1 > 0:
Hence, welfare under greenﬁeld investment with one domestic ﬁrm in the market is larger than under
the monopoly outcome over the whole range of parameter values.
It remains to establish that welfare in a purely domestic setting is larger than the two undomi-
nated results with foreign presence, namely WM;H1;H2 and WM&H2;H1: The comparison between
W;;H1;H2 and WM;H1;H2 can be simpliﬁed.13 It is sufﬁcient to consider a situation with symmetric
ﬁrms and without investment. Welfare in a situation without foreign presence is given by
W[;;H1;H2] = CS + PS
= 2
9 (a ¡ c)
2 + 1
9 (a ¡ c)
2 + 1
9 (a ¡ c)
2 = 4
9 (a ¡ c)
2 :
Welfare under greenﬁeld with the two domestic ﬁrms in the market is given by
W[M;H1;H2] = CS + PS
= 9
32 (a ¡ c)
2 + 1
16 (a ¡ c)
2 + 1
16 (a ¡ c)
2 = = 13




32 we have shown that W;;H1;H2 > WM;H1;H2:
The crucial parameter for the comparison between W;;H1;H2 and WM&H2;H1 is cH1. When
cH1 is largest (cM) welfare will be highest under both scenarios, whereas the opposite is true at its
minimum cH2. Hence, we need to show that W;;H1;H2 ¡ WM&H2;H1 ¸ 0 within these boundaries.
13Note that the sum of total sales in a market (and, therefore, also proﬁts) with n asymmetric ﬁrms ordered according to
marginal cost c1 · ::: · ci · ::: · cn will never be larger than the sum of total sales in a market with n symmetric ﬁrms





















This expression is nonnegative between cM · cH2 ·
3°(4a+5cM)¡2(4a+3cM)
27°¡14 : This upper bound is
smaller than the upper bound for a takeover of H2 (cA_H1vsH2











= 3(a ¡ cM) (33°2¡4)(3°¡2)
(45°2¡24°+4)(27°¡14) > 0:
Therefore, welfare in a situation with two domestic ﬁrms in the market is larger than welfare in a
situation where the MNE buys H2 and shares the market with H1 within the range of parameter
values where a takeover of H2 is proﬁtable for the MNE.
With the above rankings for welfare levels we have also established that welfare will always be
highest without foreign presence.
26